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Abstract
This essay re-examines the dual – republican and liberal – foundations of democratic 
legitimacy in the Western traditions of normative political theory. Considered in isola-
tion, the European Union conforms to liberal standards but cannot satisfy republican 
criteria. Given these conflicting standards, debates on the alleged European democratic 
deficit have remained inconclusive. Moreover, they have failed to pay sufficient atten-
tion to the multilevel character of the European polity and to the normative potential 
of legitimacy intermediation in its two-step compliance and legitimating relationships. 
I argue, however, that the capacity of democratic member states to legitimate the exer-
cise of European governing functions is being destroyed in the present euro crisis, and 
I briefly discuss the implications of this new constellation.
Zusammenfassung
In der westlichen Tradition der normativen politischen Theorie beruht demokratische 
Legitimität auf der doppelten Grundlage republikanischer und liberaler Prinzipien. Für 
sich betrachtet entspricht die Europäische Union zwar liberalen Kriterien, aber eben 
nicht den republikanischen Anforderungen. Angesichts so unterschiedlicher Kriterien 
konnte es auch im Streit über das angebliche europäische Demokratiedefizit keine Eini-
gung geben. Überdies ignorierte diese Diskussion den Mehrebenen-Charakter der eu-
ropäischen Politik und das normative Potenzial der Legitimationsvermittlung zwischen 
Union und Bürgern durch die demokratisch verfassten Mitgliedstaaten. Die gegenwär-
tige Eurokrise allerdings zerstört die Fähigkeit demokratischer Mitgliedstaaten, die Aus-
übung europäischer Herrschaftsfunktionen zu legitimieren. Der Aufsatz erörtert die 
Implikationen dieser neuen Konstellation.
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Legitimacy Intermediation in the Multilevel European Polity 
and Its Collapse in the Euro Crisis
1 Introduction
European integration has created a multilevel polity in which governing powers are 
exercised at the European, national, subnational and local levels. But whereas in EU 
member states there is generally a clear hierarchical relationship in which the political 
and legal bases of legitimate authority at the national level dominate those at the re-
gional and local levels, the relationship between the EU and its member states is much 
more ambivalent. European law, it is true, claims supremacy over all national law, but 
EU political legitimacy seems to be highly problematic: failed constitutional referenda, 
low and falling voter turnout at European elections, an absence of public debates about 
European policy choices, but also increasing resentment of EU interference in national 
policies and institutions and continuing worries about a “European democratic deficit.” 
These issues are coming to a head in the present euro crisis, which seems to challenge 
not only the viability but also the legitimacy of the existing architecture of governing in 
the multilevel European polity. This essay attempts to respond by confronting the dual 
traditions of legitimacy discourses in Western political theory with the governing struc-
tures of the existing European polity, and with their incipient transformation under the 
challenges of the present crisis.1
2 Legitimacy discourses
Legitimacy is a normative and highly contested concept. Its pragmatic importance in 
political systems is best clarified from a functional perspective (Scharpf 1999): in exer-
cising their powers, governments must claim resources and constrain actions in ways 
that will often conflict with the interests and political preferences of their subjects. As a 
consequence, compliance must be an underlying problem in all political systems. It may 
be brought about through coercion, based on credible threats, effective surveillance 
and punishment; or it may be brought about through inducements, based on credible 
promises and attractive rewards. Coerced and induced compliance do indeed play a 
role in all political systems. But government will be oppressive, ineffective and wasteful 
1 This paper will be published in 2013 in a Festschrift for Manfred G. Schmidt. Since Manfred 
Schmidt has been the most insightful critic of my earlier work on normative democratic theory, 
I feel encouraged to use an essay in his honor to return to those efforts with a view to their rele-
vance for the current challenges of European integration. In doing so, however, I must apologize 
for an improper amount of self-citation.
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where these mechanisms play more than a supportive role in stabilizing a general pat-
tern of voluntary compliance that is not based on the explicit cost-benefit calculations 
of self-interested subjects.
Most of the time, of course, law abidance is habitual. But when the discrepancy between 
required behavior and personal interests and preferences increases, and when low-risk 
opportunities for evasion exist, legitimacy beliefs may become a crucial factor contrib-
uting to the voluntary compliance with undesired rules or decisions of governing au-
thority (Easton 1965: 278–319; Kielmansegg 1971; Beetham 1991; Scharpf 1999, 2007; 
Höffe 2002: 40). Such beliefs, however, are not primarily a matter of individual con-
sciences. To create a sense of moral obligation and to provide justification for the “losers’ 
consent” (Anderson et al. 2005), they need to be socially shared and reinforced through 
justifying narratives and discourses. Where they are effective, they will reduce the need 
for and the cost of controls and of negative or positive sanctions that would otherwise 
be needed to ensure compliance. In other words, socially supported legitimacy beliefs 
should be seen as a functional prerequisite for the existence of governments which are, 
at the same time, effective, efficient and liberal.
But before turning to the substantive discourses supporting legitimating beliefs in 
Western political systems, I need to introduce three conceptual presuppositions which I 
will use in subsequent discussions without being able to fully develop and justify them 
in this paper. The first concerns David Easton’s (1965: Ch. 10) hierarchy of legitimating 
references. Support for a political system may relate to the characteristics of the au-
thorities exercising acts of government, to the characteristics of the political regime that 
empowers these authorities, or to the characteristics of the political community that is 
governed through this regime. The implication is that potential noncompliance may be 
countered not only by arguments justifying the specific policy in question but also by ar-
guments asserting the legitimacy of higher levels of the political system in question. But 
there is also a reverse implication which will play a role in my discussion of legitimacy 
in the multilevel European polity. 
Second, if the function of legitimacy is to ensure the acceptance of unwelcome acts 
of government, it also follows that the need for legitimation increases with the severity 
of the sacrifices imposed and/or the political salience of the issues at stake. If policies 
match my interests and preferences, my compliance does not depend on legitimating 
arguments. On the other hand, normative appeals will also vary in their legitimating 
capacity. Thus, where vital interests and deeply held normative convictions are at stake, 
very powerful arguments may need to be invoked if potential defectors are to be per-
suaded to refrain from noncompliance, civil disobedience or violent protest. In other 
words, legitimacy should be understood as a relational concept, rather than as an invari-
ant characteristic of policies or polities. This will also play a role in the later discussion 
of the alleged European democratic deficit. 
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Finally, I will also refer to the distinction between input-oriented and output-oriented 
legitimating arguments (Scharpf 1970, 1999; M. G. Schmidt 2008; Ruffing 2011). These 
concepts resonate with discussions of “representative and responsible government” 
(Birch 1964; Mair 2008, 2009) or of governments as “agents” and as “trustees” of the 
people (Alter 2008). What matters, in other words, is the responsiveness of governors to 
the collective preferences of their constituencies and their capacity to serve the common 
interest of the political community in accordance with its norms and values. 
From a historical and intercultural perspective, the arguments invoked in legitimating 
discourses vary widely. In the specific context of constitutional democracies in the Eu-
ropean Union, however, their premises and implications may be elaborated and clarified 
through reference to the core arguments of two distinct traditions in Western political 
philosophy – for which I will use the labels “republican” and “liberal.”2 Whereas the for-
mer emphasizes the common good of the polity and the collective self-determination of 
its citizens, the latter highlights the protection of individual rights and the need to base 
the exercise of governing powers on the consent of those who are affected. 
The republican discourse
Republicanism is rooted in the Aristotelian tradition – whose contemporary vitality is 
manifest in the communitarianism of Alasdair MacIntyre (1984, 1988) or Charles Tay-
lor (1992) and others.3 Here, man is understood as a zoon politikon who could not exist 
in isolation and who can only grow to realize his own intrinsic telos within a politeia that 
provides the preconditions for the eudaimonia of its members. In that sense, the pol-
ity is prior to the individual (Aristotle 350 B. C.: Book 1, 1253a). In order to realize the 
common good – which is the precondition for the good life of its members – the polity 
needs to be governed, and it needs to be governed well. In principle, good government 
may be achieved in monarchic, aristocratic or democratic constitutions – but each of 
these is also vulnerable to characteristic perversions if the powers of government are 
employed to serve private or partisan advantages. Given the overriding importance of 
the common good, however, the remedy could not be constraints on the powers of gov-
ernment. Instead, Aristotle’s focus is on the need for virtuous governors and on condi-
tions and institutional arrangements that would favor their selection and continuing 
commitment to the common good of the polity (Aristotle 350 B. C.: Book 3). 
2 In the literature, these labels are not used consistently, and contemporary discussions of dem-
ocratic legitimacy tend to combine arguments derived from both traditions. I hope to show, 
however, that it is theoretically and pragmatically useful to identify the distinct logics of these 
discourses. 
3 This is not meant to deny differences within the tradition. Lovett and Pettit (2009), for instance, 
take pains to differentiate their own “neo-republicanism“ from the communitarian literature 
– and within the former camp, “neo-Athenian” and “neo-Roman” positions will also differ on 
some points (Schäfer 2011).
4 MPIfG Discussion Paper 12/6
From his output-oriented focus on the common good, Aristotle, who like Plato was 
unimpressed by the performance of Athenian direct democracy during the Pelopon-
nesian War (M. G. Schmidt 2008: 41–43), saw little reason to place higher trust in the 
continuing virtuousness of citizens (in the role of democratic governors) than in that of 
aristocrats or monarchs. On balance, he thought that orientation to the common good 
might be most secure in a mixed constitution that combined elements of democracy 
and aristocracy. But if there was to be democracy, the common good would require the 
free and equal participation of all citizens (among whom women and slaves were not 
included) in public debates over the laws through which they would mutually govern 
each other (Aristotle 350 B. C.: Book 3; Book 6, 1317b). 
The concern for the common good of the polity, the virtuousness of governors, and its 
institutional preconditions had also shaped the political philosophy of republican Rome. 
Going beyond Aristotle’s institutional relativism, however, Roman republicanism rejected 
the option of monocratic power and insisted on civic participation in the mixed constitu-
tion of a self-governing res publica (Cicero 51 B. C.). A millennium later, the Roman aspi-
rations reappeared in the Florentine Republic, where Machiavelli’s Discorsi (1531) also 
reflected on the frailty of the virtues that were required for maintaining a civitas libera 
(Pocock 1975). From there, one branch in the history of political ideas leads to James Har-
rington (1656) and other “neo-Roman” theorists of an egalitarian “free commonwealth” 
during the short-lived English republic (Skinner 1998, 2008) who, in turn, had a powerful 
influence on the political thought of the American Revolution and on Jeffersonian and 
Jacksonian democracy in the early history of the Union (Pocock 1975; Dahl 1989: Ch. 2; 
Pettit 1997). In contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy, these emphases on 
republican liberty, democratic self-determination and political community are of vital 
importance in “neo-republican” as well as “communitarian” discourses.4
The other branch in the history of republican thought leads to the democratic radical-
ism of Rousseau’s Contrat Social (1762), which shaped the political thought of the 
French Revolution and continues to have a powerful influence on Continental demo-
cratic theory. With the classical heritage, Rousseau shares the primacy of the political 
community, the output-oriented emphasis on the common good, and the absence of 
institutional limitations on the powers of government (M. G. Schmidt 2008: 94). At the 
same time, however, he radicalizes the aspirations of republican liberty, and his institu-
tional preferences are shaped by the input-oriented practices of Athenian democracy. 
Liberty for all, in his view, could only be achieved through general laws which are deter-
mined by the equal participation of all in collective choices (Contrat Social, Book 1, 
Ch. 6; Book 2, Chs. 1, 4). His assumption was that such laws would be adopted by ma-
jority vote.5 But then, as it had for Aristotle, the “virtuousness” of citizens in the role of 
4 Cf. Michelman (1989); Pettit (1997); Skinner (1998); Kramer (2004); Bellamy (2007); Lovett/
Pettit (2009) on the one hand, and Walzer (1983); MacIntyre (1984); Taylor (1992); Sandel 
(1982, 1996) on the other.
5 In fact, Rousseau anticipated the analytical argument of the “Condorcet jury theorem” several 
decades before its publication: assuming that the common interest was objectively given, its 
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the collective legislators became the critical problem. For Rousseau this meant that the 
aggregate concerns of self-interested individuals (volonté des tous) needed to be trans-
formed into common-interest oriented collective choices (volonté générale). Since – 
unlike the English and American “aristocratic republicans” (Dahl 1989: 25–26) – he was 
unwilling to consider a non-egalitarian mixed constitution,6 he had to restrict the po-
tential application of his normative postulates to relatively small communities with a 
high degree of pre-existing social homogeneity (Contrat Social, Book 2, Chs. 8–10). 
That precondition, however, was obviously lacking when, after 1789, Rousseau’s politi-
cal philosophy came to shape the ideals of the democratic revolution in France. Nev-
ertheless, in the subsequent evolution of representative democracy, the theoretical dif-
ficulty was pragmatically resolved by an institutional architecture which combined the 
medieval representation of estates (which Rousseau had rejected as unequal) with the 
egalitarian aspirations of democratic self-government (Pitkin 1972; Dahl 1989: 28–30), 
and could thus claim to satisfy the output- and input-oriented criteria of republicanism 
at the same time. Here, legislation was delegated to representatives who were expected 
to exercise their mandates as “trustees” for the common interest of the community. But 
these mandates would be established and withdrawn through periodic general elec-
tions based on universal and equal suffrage – with the consequence that representatives 
could be held accountable for their exercise of governing powers by the electorate at 
large. Moreover, to ensure the common-interest orientation of legislative and electoral 
choices alike, policy-making and politics were to be shaped by continuous discussions 
in the public space of the political community (Habermas 1962; Elster 1998).
The liberal discourse
Republican liberty insists on the prevention of arbitrary or partisan rule, and basic in-
dividual rights and civil liberties are necessary preconditions for political participation 
and self-determination. Beyond that, however, the extent to which individual interest 
positions are to be protected is to be determined in the political processes that will 
define the common good of the community as well as the standards of justice and the 
reach of individual rights. In liberal political philosophy, by contrast, the normative 
order is reversed.7 Here, the individual is prior to the political community, individual 
identification may be equated to a search for truth. Since individual perceptions of truth may 
vary somewhat, the larger number of (sincere and independent) votes should identify the best 
approximation (Berg 1996; Grofman/Feld 2006).
6 Equality, for Rousseau, was only required for the legislative function. The executive might well 
be monarchic or aristocratic.
7 In the words of Michelman (1989: 446–447): “In a republican view, a community’s objective, 
common good substantially consists in the success of its political endeavour to define, establish, 
effectuate, and sustain the set of rights (less tendentiously, laws) best suited to the conditions 
and mores of that community. Whereas in a contrasting liberal view, the higher-law rights pro-
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self-determination limits the domain of legitimate collective action, and the protection 
of individual interests takes the place of the republican commitment to a holistically 
defined common good. 
These, at any rate, are the premises of the Anglo-American tradition of liberal political 
philosophy. Its roots do not go back to antiquity but, paradoxically, to Thomas Hobbes’ 
efforts to justify the restoration of monarchical prerogatives after the English Revolu-
tion. To achieve this purpose, Hobbes had to attack the republican concept of liberty 
as freedom from domination (because it implied collective self-government) and re-
place it with the individualistic concept of liberty as freedom from interference (Skinner 
2008). In a hypothetical state of nature, so the basic argument of the Leviathan (1651), 
this liberty was continuously threatened by the bellum omnium contra omnes. To escape 
from it, individual self-interest would dictate submission to a sovereign authority with 
unconstrained power to ensure the security of life, liberty and property of its subjects. 
From this remarkably unpromising start, however, liberal political philosophy – from 
John Locke (1690), Adam Smith (1776) and Jeremy Bentham (1789) to Friedrich A. 
Hayek (1960), Milton Friedman (1962) or Richard Nozick (1974) – has developed nor-
mative precepts which would continuously extend the domains of individual liberty 
and justify ever tighter constraints on the governing powers of the political community. 
The intellectual and political success of liberal political philosophy was due, to a large 
extent, to its symbiotic co-evolution with classical, neo-classical and institutional eco-
nomics. Sharing individual self-interest as their normative and methodological premise, 
liberal political theory and classical economic theory also converged in their conclu-
sions: the republican concept of a holistically defined “common good” was, of course, 
rejected. And while utilitarian welfare economics proposed to replace it by the maxi-
mization of aggregate individual interests (Kaldor 1939), that solution is regarded as 
unacceptably collectivistic by libertarian political philosophers (e.g., Hayek 1976), who 
would only consider Pareto efficiency as a liberty-preserving criterion of legitimate 
political action. Moreover, where the republican tradition had considered virtuous 
government as a necessary precondition of societal and individual well-being, classi-
cal economic theory claimed to show that the “wealth of nations” was brought about 
by the uncoerced (and morally unencumbered8) interactions of self-interested private 
individuals guided by the “invisible hand” of free markets. And if individual interests in 
material well-being could be realized by the market, it was also possible to reduce the 
threatening omnipotence of the Hobbesian sovereign to those governing functions that 
were essential for the maintenance of external and internal security, the establishment 
and protection of property rights, and the enforcement of contracts. In other words, it 
vide the transactional structures and the curbs on power required so that pluralistic pursuit of 
diverse and conflicting interests may proceed as satisfactorily as possible.”
8 Adam Smith, it is true, had introduced a moral philosophy based on “sympathy” among the 
members of a community in his “Theory of Moral Sentiments” (1759). But the economics of 
his “Wealth of Nations” (1776) presuppose rational egotism and provide theoretical respectabil-
ity for the “private vices – public benefits” hyperbole of Mandeville’s “Fable of the Bees” (1714). 
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was the symbiosis with classical economic theory that allowed liberal political philoso-
phy to shift its focus from the republican concern with the preconditions of “virtuous” 
government to institutional solutions that would reduce the domain of governing pow-
ers and constrain their exercise.
But that was not the only effect of the symbiosis. Given the Hobbesian switch to “nega-
tive liberty” – understood as the “freedom of pursuing our own good in our own way” 
(Berlin 1958: 11) – restraints imposed by governing authorities needed to be justified 
in all spheres. And since market interactions are considered to be voluntary by defini-
tion, and hence compatible with negative liberty, the sphere of legitimate government 
action is reduced to functions that could not be performed by the market. In other 
words, the correction of analytically defined “market failures” is seen as circumscribing 
the domain of permissible public purposes. Even within this domain (which is gener-
ally circumscribed by welfare economics), however, the legitimacy of political choice is 
further challenged by the “Public Choice” variant of libertarian political theory. 
Just as the “private vices–public benefits” logic of classical economic theory did not pos-
tulate virtuous economic actors, the Public-Choice theory of politics also does not base 
its expectations on the republican postulate of common-interest oriented governors. 
In the absence of an “invisible hand”, therefore, models assuming purely self-interested 
politicians, bureaucrats and citizens inevitably came to expect massive “government 
failures” (Niskanen 1971; Buchanan 1986; Mueller 1989). And compared to these, even 
the market failures identified by welfare economics would often appear as the lesser 
evil. On the basis of these models, the normative political theory of modern liberalism 
generally supports the deregulation and privatization of a wide range of state functions 
that had formerly been considered necessary remedies for market failures. Beyond that, 
radical libertarian theorists like Nozick (1974) and Hayek (1960, 1976) also challenge 
the legitimacy of redistributive government functions. They do not deny that even ideal 
markets may generate massive inequalities of wealth, incomes and life chances. But 
since (economic) theory cannot derive “objective” standards of distributional justice 
from its models, all political attempts to correct market outcomes would be qualified as 
arbitrary and hence illegitimate interferences with negative liberty. 
In institutional terms, therefore, the foremost concern of liberal political theory is to 
limit the potential reach of governing authority through the constitutional protection 
of individual rights. And where the need for governing powers cannot be generally de-
nied, the liberal ideal is government by a consensus of the affected interests. Ideally, 
therefore, the decision rule ought to be unanimity (Buchanan/Tullock 1962). But since 
that is not usually practicable, liberalism’s main concern is to prevent the “tyranny of 
the majority” through the checks and balances postulated by James Madison in the Fed-
eralist No. 51 (Madison/Hamilton/Jay 1788), through super-majoritarian decision rules, 
multiple veto positions, and pluralist patterns of interest intermediation (Truman 1951; 
Dahl 1967).
8 MPIfG Discussion Paper 12/6
The ideological triumph of market liberalism has overshadowed a second tradition of 
liberal political philosophy, originating in the Continental rather than the English and 
Scottish Age of Enlightenment. Immanuel Kant’s premises were as individualistic – and 
hence as anti-republican – as those of Hobbes, Locke and Adam Smith. But Kant’s start-
ing point in his Grundlegung (1785) was the moral autonomy of the rational individual, 
rather than the sanctity of individual self-interest. Finding himself (women were still 
not considered) with the capacity of reason, man must become aware of his own free-
dom and the concomitant duty to act on the basis of his own cognitive and normative 
judgments. But reason will also tell him that the same conditions apply to all other 
human actors as well, and that the exercise of his own freedom must be limited by the 
equal freedom of all others. As for Hobbes, therefore, the basic problem is the potential 
incompatibility of individual actions. For Kant, however, the solution cannot be the 
sacrifice of individual autonomy to the hierarchical authority of a sovereign. Instead, 
voluntary self-coordination can be achieved by reason itself – which, guided by the 
“categorical imperative,” will only allow the choice of actions whose maxims the rational 
actor could want to see established as a general law. 
Assuming what game theorists call “complete information,” and allowing the even more 
heroic assumption that different actors will converge in their assessment of the nor-
mative appropriateness of particular rules of conduct, self-coordination through the 
categorical imperative might indeed work in a model world. But Kant is too realistic 
to ignore the “crooked timber” of human nature – meaning the fact that individual 
action may also be driven by passions and self-interest, rather than being guided by 
pure reason. Hence the moral imperative by itself would not ensure the practical com-
patibility of autonomous actions. In practice, therefore, individual choices need to be 
constrained by binding laws which are so effectively sanctioned that they would work 
even for a “society of devils.” But if these laws are to nevertheless approximate a state 
of universal freedom, they must be laws of general application and they must prescribe 
rules of conduct to which all who are affected should and could freely agree in their ca-
pacity as morally autonomous and rational actors. In other words, Kant moves the co-
ordination problem from the level of individual action to the level of general rules, and 
he deals with the problem of normative convergence by moving from the un-coerced 
agreement of real actors to a criterion of virtual consensus. 
In contrast to its Anglo-American sibling, Kantian liberalism did not develop in sym-
biosis with classical and neo-classical economic theory.9 And since its basic criterion of 
legitimacy was the generality and consensual acceptability of binding rules, it also did 
not postulate the existence of inviolable individual interests or impose dogmatic limits 
9 It is true, however, that ordoliberal economists and lawyers, whose work was influential in shap-
ing the normative foundations of a “social market economy” in postwar Germany, did draw on 
Kantian philosophy for some of their precepts – for instance, for insisting on general competi-
tion rules rather than discretionary state interventions in the economy. See, e.g., Böhm (1950); 
Eucken (1960, 1969); Mestmäcker (1994); Schlecht (2000).
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on the potential domain of governing functions. Thus John Rawls’ (1971) search for 
criteria of distributive justice would be fully compatible with Kantian liberalism – but 
incompatible with Hayek’s or Nozick’s libertarian principles. Moreover, if my freedom 
excludes all choices that could violate the equal freedom of others, the categorical imper-
ative could also justify very stringent restrictions on negative liberty. And as Isaiah Berlin 
(1958: 29–39) pointed out, the virtual-consensus test through which its meaning is to be 
ascertained may well depend on information and analyses for which ordinary citizens 
or democratic majorities seem poorly qualified and which might thus be best left to the 
vicarious judgment of experts. In other words, like Rousseau’s republicanism, Kantian 
liberalism also has an authoritarian dimension and it may be invoked to legitimate laws 
that depart widely from the empirical preferences of ordinary citizens (Somek 2008).
But then, Kant was a well-established professor writing under a regime of enlightened 
absolutism in eighteenth-century Prussia, and he had no intention of designing either 
the constitution of a liberal democracy or the ground rules of a liberal market economy. 
Nevertheless, his insistence on government through laws of general application con-
tinues to have a powerful influence on the constitutional theory of liberal democracies, 
and there is at least a formal correspondence between Kant’s criterion of virtual consen-
sus and the liberal preference for unanimous or super-majoritarian decisions, checks 
and balances, pluralism and stakeholder democracy. At the same time, however, Jürgen 
Habermas’ (1992) influential concept of “deliberative democracy” – which could not be 
farther removed from the normative models of market-liberal political theory – also 
has obvious Kantian roots, and may in fact be seen as an attempt to provide a republi-
can solution to a problem that Kant had failed to resolve.
Kant expected individual reason to ensure the compatibility of individual actions if 
these are guided by the generalizing logic of the categorical imperative. Conflicts, in 
other words, could only arise from the non-rational and selfish impulses of human na-
ture. Since these ought to have no influence on legislation, the criterion of reason-based 
consensus, which would legitimate state-imposed general laws, could be seen as a mat-
ter of objective determination. Habermas starts from a similar position when he insists 
that deliberative democracy should only admit arguments representing “generalizable 
interests.” In contrast to Kant, however, he allows for an initial plurality of bona fide gen-
eralized preferences. As a consequence, the determination of legitimate laws cannot be 
the object of vicarious analyses. It requires a participatory solution where policy choices 
should emerge from processes of uncoerced and consensus-seeking public debates in a 
shared political space. In other words, though starting from Kant’s idealistic individual-
ism, the aspirations of deliberative democracy have less in common with liberal politi-
cal theory than with the republican ideal of collective self-determination.10 
10 There is a caveat, however. The absence of theoretically specified institutional preconditions 
and the emphasis on consensus-oriented deliberation have contributed to the attractiveness of 
the Habermasian approach for students affirming the democratic legitimacy of present govern-
ing institutions “beyond the state.” There is a temptation to ignore the postulates of egalitar-
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Differences
It has become clear that both republican and liberal political philosophy rely on output-
oriented as well as input-oriented legitimating arguments – but that they use these with 
different references. In the republican tradition, output-oriented arguments emphasize 
a holistic notion of the common good of the polity. Its substantive content, however, 
cannot be derived from normative theory but must be defined by virtuous governors 
(and, in a democracy, virtuous citizens) in the governing process itself. Liberal theory, 
by contrast, offers positive as well as negative specifications of output legitimacy. Posi-
tively, the basic function of government is to protect the security of life, liberty and 
property against external and internal threats. Beyond that, however, output-oriented 
liberal arguments have a negative thrust, emphasizing normative constraints on exer-
cises of public authority that would interfere with individual liberty. More specifically, 
market liberalism denies legitimacy to all state functions that could potentially be sub-
stituted by free markets or that interfere with the free operation of markets. 
These choices on the output side will also shape, or at least constrain, the dominant 
input-oriented legitimating arguments of both traditions. For liberalism, the choice 
seems straightforward: the function of ensuring external security and internal law and 
order is best entrusted to a Hobbesian executive power whose decisions are placed be-
yond the reach of partisan politics. Moreover, the function of protecting individual 
liberties against the “tyranny of the majority” is best ensured by delegating potentially 
divisive governing functions to the non-political trusteeship of independent (ordinary 
and constitutional) courts, independent central banks and independent regulatory 
agencies. With the domain of “political” choices thus drastically narrowed, liberal po-
litical philosophy is free to define individual autonomy as the supreme value and gov-
ernment by consensus as its institutional ideal. It is approximated in institutions with 
super-majoritarian decision rules, multiple veto positions and free access for the widest 
range of “civil society” groups and organizations. If the consequence is a structural bias 
favoring the defenders of the status quo and handicapping the proponents of political 
change, this is welcomed as a protection of negative liberty – except, of course, in situ-
ations where the status quo is defined by state-imposed rules that interfere with the 
exercise of individual liberties (Ganghof 2009). As a consequence, liberalism has a “thin” 
concept of “citizenship” which, essentially, ensures protection for a range of individual 
rights that is wider and more secure than the set of universally recognized human rights. 
And it provides no explicit normative reasons for an obligation to comply with acts of 
government imposing sacrifices to which one has not consented. 
ian participation and publicness and to treat the mere discovery of deliberation (or “arguing”) 
among participants in international or supranational decision processes as evidence of a demo-
cratically legitimating practice (Joerges/Neyer 1997; Schmalz-Bruns 1999; Dryzek 2002). 
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In republicanism, by contrast, “citizenship” implies not only the rights, but also the 
obligations of membership in a self-governing political community (Karolewski 2010). 
Civic rights need to be protected to ensure the capacity, the equal standing and the 
freedom of citizens to participate in political processes; and civic obligations include 
the moral duty to exercise rights of participation with a view to the common interest 
of the community (Schäfer 2011),11 and to accept the burdens and sacrifices imposed 
by legitimated political processes. Hence input-oriented legitimacy has to bear heavier 
burdens than is true in liberalism. The “no-domination” principle of republican liberty 
rules out Hobbesian executive powers, and it puts limits on the delegation of govern-
ing powers to non-accountable courts and agencies. Instead, the principles of collec-
tive self-determination and equal participation would allow majority rule within the 
constraints of constitutionally protected civic rights. At the same time, however, input-
oriented republican legitimacy is constrained by the output-oriented criterion of “buon 
governo” (D. Schmidt 2003), requiring virtuous governors to practice justice and pursue 
the common good of the polity. In principle, therefore, legislators and governments 
in representative democracies are confronted with conflicting requirements – they are 
oath-bound to act as trustees of the common interest and, at the same time, they are 
treated as accountable agents of constituents who are free to grant or withdraw govern-
ing mandates in general and periodic elections. 
The solution to this dilemma of democratic republicanism is John Stuart Mill’s ideal of 
“government by public debate” (Habermas 1962, 1992): public affairs should neither be 
managed by non-accountable trustees nor by agents guided solely by the fear of sanc-
tions imposed by self-interested and poorly informed electorates. Instead, governors 
and citizens should be engaged in debates and controversies in a shared public space 
where proponents and opponents will justify and criticize specific choices through 
reference to the common good and the common norms and values of the political 
community. Under these conditions, republicans expect that voters will also respond 
as public-interest oriented citizens – which then allows them to accept majority rule 
without provoking the liberal fears of “tyranny” or “populism” (Riker 1982). 
Clearly, the requirements for input-oriented legitimacy are more demanding in repub-
lican theory than they are in liberalism. And so they should be, given the different di-
viding line between what must be left to private autonomy and what may potentially 
become the subject of public affairs. Republican self-government may legitimately at-
tempt to shape socioeconomic and sociocultural conditions that liberalism would place 
beyond public interference. And whereas liberalism, even of the Kantian variety, faces 
great theoretical difficulties in justifying corrections of market-allocated life chances 
(Rawls 1971), solidaristic redistribution among the members of the political commu-
11 Kimpell (2009) argues that nineteenth-century republican theorists replaced “civic virtue” with 
“enlightened self-interest.” In my view, this should be seen as a move from republicanism to 
liberalism.
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nity has become a core issue of twentieth-century republican politics. It follows that 
republicanism must be more concerned with the quality of the inputs and politics that 
shape the exercise of such far reaching potential powers. 
In the context of discussions about a European democratic deficit, however, the most 
important difference concerns the place of “political community” in liberal and repub-
lican legitimating arguments. Referring back to David Easton’s (1965) hierarchy, it ap-
pears that liberal arguments focus on the quality of policies and on institutional safe-
guards at the level of governing authorities and constitutional regimes. But given their 
individualistic premises, the reference to political community has no legitimating func-
tion in liberal discourses. Human rights and individual interests may be effectively pro-
tected within any aggregate of persons that happens to be assembled under a “decent” 
(Rawls 1999) constitution. If properly constrained governing action should neverthe-
less violate individual preferences, “exit” rather than “loyalty” and “voice” (Hirschman 
1970), and “voting with the feet” (Tiebout 1956) are seen as appropriate remedies. In 
that sense, liberalism appears as a truly universalistic or cosmopolitan political philoso-
phy whose insistence on the security of life, liberty and property rights, tightly circum-
scribed political functions and consensual decision making could define “good gover-
nance” within any aggregate of individuals anywhere and at any time. 
By contrast, republicanism (and even more so, its “communitarian” variant) must ap-
pear inherently particularistic. From its Aristotelian origins onward, the focus has been 
on specific political communities with a remembered past and an anticipated future, 
and with a commitment to shaping the common good of these communities with the 
support of and in response to their citizens.12 And “republican liberty,” understood as a 
principle of “non-domination,” is meant to ensure the collective self-determination of 
citizens, rather than the negative liberty of individuals. Hence the polity as a political 
community of self-governing citizens with a specific collective identity has remained 
the ultimate referent of republican legitimating arguments (Miller 2000). And the more 
the functions of government are extended, and the more they may interfere with indi-
vidual preferences, the more the relational character of legitimating arguments comes 
into play. It increases the relative importance of appeals to the “we-identity” and the 
solidarity of citizens and it emphasizes the orientation of public debates to a common 
interest and shared norms of justice that may legitimate the sacrifice of self-interested 
concerns. That is why republican perspectives on European integration must pay atten-
tion to information about the historical factors facilitating state and nation building 
(Rokkan/Eisenstadt 1975) or about the breakup of established states like the former 
Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia and the current difficulties of majoritarian democracy 
12 In Easton’s (1965) terminology, what matters here is not merely the existence of a political com-
munity defined by frequent political interactions (177), but a “sense of political community” 
(184–189) – defined as “… the feeling of belonging together as a group which, because it shares 
a political structure, also shares a political fate … [T]o the extent there is a feeling of political 
community, the members will possess mutual sympathy and loyalty with respect to their par-
ticipation in a common political unit” (185, emphasis in original). 
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in polities with conflicting collective identities like Belgium (Billiet/Maddens/Frognier 
2006; Swenden/Jans 2006), Canada, Spain or Northern Ireland, for that matter. By the 
same token, the erosion of national boundaries and the difficulties of recreating condi-
tions of “boundedness” on a European scale (Bartolini 2005; Ferrera 2005) will be of 
concern only in the context of republican legitimating discourses (Karolewski 2010). 
3 Constitutional democracies – and the European Union?
The discussion above has accentuated the differences between the dual traditions of 
Western political philosophy. But conceptual distinctions do not rule out either prag-
matic coexistence or normative complementarity. On the contrary: the institutions and 
practices of Western constitutional democracies and their normative beliefs are based 
on the combination of principles that have been asserted separately in the republican 
and in the liberal traditions. They are all liberal polities in the sense that the state is 
responsible for external and internal security and the protection of property rights, 
that governing powers are distributed and constitutionally constrained, that individual 
rights are protected by an independent judiciary, and that plural interests have access 
to the policy-making processes by which they are affected. At the same time, however, 
Western constitutional democracies are all republican in the sense that they are repre-
sentative democracies where governing authority is directly or indirectly obtained and 
withdrawn through regular, universal, free and equal elections, where policy choices are 
shaped through public debates and the competition of office-seeking political parties, 
and where institutions that are exempt from electoral accountability will still operate 
in the shadow of democratic majorities or, at least, of a democratic pouvoir constituant. 
Moreover, public policy everywhere is heavily involved in replacing or correcting mar-
ket outcomes by providing education, health care, social services and social transfers 
either directly or through redistributive regulations and subsidies. And interventions 
in the market are more frequent everywhere than market-liberal doctrines would allow. 
In other words, republican and liberal principles coexist, and they constrain, comple-
ment and reinforce each other in the constitutions and political practices of all Western 
democracies (Michelman 1999; Habermas 2001; Bellamy 2007). Nevertheless, the actu-
al institutions vary in the extent to which they facilitate liberal or republican practices – 
and these practices will, in turn, shape the emphases of the prevailing discourses on po-
litical legitimacy (Lijphart 1999; V. A. Schmidt 2006). But these differences seem to fade 
in importance if we now turn our attention from the world of democratic nation-states 
to the European Union. When seen by itself and judged by the standards discussed here, 
the Union appears as the extreme case of a polity conforming to liberal principles but 
which, at the same time, lacks practically all republican credentials. 
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The EU’s liberalism is most obvious in the priority it accords to the protection of (cer-
tain) individual rights and the tight institutional constraints on majoritarian political 
action: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is more removed from correction by politi-
cally accountable actors than the constitutional court of any democratic state. From early 
on, it has interpreted the Treaty commitment to establish a Europe-wide market and the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital not as a programmatic goal to be 
realized through political legislation, but as a set of directly enforceable individual rights 
that will override all laws and institutional arrangements of EU member states. More-
over, the ECJ has also begun to protect non-economic human rights (Weiler 1999), and 
it is now dynamically extending their reach (Wollenschläger 2007; Scharpf 2010, 2012).
At the same time, the European polity’s capacity for effective political action is impeded 
by the existence of multiple veto positions in European legislation; and the input side 
of its political processes could not be more pluralist and less majoritarian in character. 
The Commission itself, which has a near monopoly of legislative initiatives, relies on 
an extended infrastructure of committees and expert groups allowing access to a wide 
range of interest associations and “civil society” organizations. Moreover, through the 
Council of Ministers, whose agreement by at least a qualified-majority vote is required 
for all legislation, all interests that have access to the national ministries in charge will 
also have access to the European level. Finally, the European Parliament, whose role in 
legislation has been considerably expanded in recent Treaty revisions, also prides itself 
on giving voice to interests and concerns that might possibly have been ignored in the 
Commission and the Council. In short, it is extremely unlikely that significant stake-
holder interests could be victimized by a “tyranny of the majority” at the European level. 
But if the EU does qualify by liberal standards, it definitely fails by the criteria of re-
publican democracy. On the output side, the Union’s capacity to promote the common 
good is constrained by the consensus requirements of a multiple-veto system (Scharpf 
1988; Falkner 2011). These requirements prevent effective collective action in response 
to many problems that member states could not deal with nationally. The EU’s notori-
ous difficulties in developing a common foreign and security policy and its inability to 
regulate competition over taxes on company profits and capital incomes are just the 
most glaring examples (Howorth 2007; Ganghof/Genschel 2008a, 2008b). Moreover, 
these same decision rules are responsible for an extreme conservative bias in EU policy. 
While new legislation must have broad political support, once it is adopted, it cannot 
be abolished or amended in response to changed circumstances or changed preferences 
as long as either the Commission refuses to present an initiative or a few member states 
object. Beyond that, all rules derived from the judicial interpretation of the Treaties can 
only be corrected through Treaty amendments, which must be adopted unanimously by 
member governments and ratified by parliaments or popular referenda in all member 
states. In other words, once EU law is in place, the acquis is nearly irreversible, and its 
correspondence with the common good of the Union (or contemporary political pref-
erences) becomes progressively more tenuous as time goes on (Scharpf 2009). 
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From an output-oriented republican perspective, therefore, the European polity suffers 
from a problem-solving gap where member states find their policy space constrained 
by European law, while the capacity for political action at the European level is con-
strained by very high consensus requirements. In theory, of course, the multiple-veto 
constraints could be relaxed through a move to majoritarian decision rules for Euro-
pean legislation. But from a republican pespective, this remedy could only deepen the 
European legitimacy deficit. 
In the absence of a strong collective identity, the peoples of the 27 member states do not 
constitute a political community that could legitimate a regime of Europe-wide major-
ity rule on politically salient issues. And if it were installed nevertheless, political inter-
actions would not meet republican standards: there are as yet no Europe-wide media 
of political communication and debates, no Europe-wide political parties to articulate 
and aggregate citizen interests and preferences, no Europe-wide party competition fo-
cused on highly salient European policy choices – and thus no way in which the citizens 
of European member states could respond collectively to proposed or actually adopt-
ed policy choices at the European level or to their effects. Regardless of the increas-
ing powers of the European Parliament, therefore, there are no European governors 
(or governing parties13) that must anticipate and respond to the egalitarian control 
of Europe-wide election returns (Greven 2000; Harlow 2002; Follesdal/Hix 2006; Hix 
2008). While some republican authors hope that these deficiencies might be overcome 
through institutional reforms facilitating the politicization of European policy choices, 
they seem to pay insufficient attention to the EU’s lack of “political-community” foun-
dations14 – which republican theory must treat as a crucial precondition for collective 
self-determination by majority rule (Karolewski 2010). And for the time being, at any 
rate, even optimistic empirical assessments will only assert the existence of a “thin” and 
unevenly shared European collective identity that will not support the majoritarian 
resolution of highly salient and divisive issues at the European level (Risse 2010). 
4 Legitimacy intermediation in the multilevel European polity
From a republican perspective, therefore, challenges to European acts of government 
cannot be met at the higher levels of David Easton’s (1965) hierarchy of legitimating 
arguments. As a political community, the European Union has at best very weak claims 
13 In multi-party or “consociational” polities, voters may not be able to oust a government, but 
they may be able to punish individual governing parties.
14 More optimistic authors should at least pause to reflect on the present state of Belgian politics, 
where political mobilization in the Flemish and Walloon communities seems to commit politi-
cal leaders to policies maximizing the perceived interests of each community – and to drastically 
reduce their freedom to agree to compromises at the national level (Berge/Grasse 2003; Billiet/
Maddison/Frognier 2006; Swenden/Jans 2006; Bursens/Sinardet 2009). 
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on the loyalty of disaffected citizens; as a political regime, it does not conform to demo-
cratic standards of political interaction; and while the legality of EU authorities is not 
in question, they lack the legitimating essential of electoral accountability. Nevertheless, 
academic concerns over the alleged European democratic deficit have only recently be-
gun to provoke political discussions outside of the European Parliament. And in light of 
the rapidly increasing volume of European policy output, observers assuming republi-
can criteria of political legitimacy might truly wonder why political protests and demon-
strations against EU policies were extremely rare before the present crisis, and why open 
noncompliance, civil disobedience and active resistance were practically unheard of.
From a republican perspective, this puzzle could be resolved by two connected hypoth-
eses. The first one starts from the relational concept mentioned above, which suggests 
that the supply of legitimacy need not be greater than the demand for it. Thus, Euro-
pean policy-makers, being aware of the weakness of EU legitimacy at the “community” 
and “regime” levels, may have avoided highly intrusive and politically controversial pol-
icy choices. At the same time, and perhaps more plausibly, the multiple-veto constraints 
of EU policy processes may have prevented the adoption of policies that would violate 
the highly salient concerns of member-state constituencies. In either case, EU policies 
would avoid manifest challenges testing the legitimacy of European governing powers.
In spite of its surface plausibility, however, this hypothesis does not seem to address the 
fact that even before the onset of the euro crisis, there were European policies which 
had a massive impact on the economies, institutions and policy legacies of EU member 
states, and which have been analyzed – and sometimes celebrated – in the literature on 
“Europeanization” (see, e.g., Cowles/Caporaso/Risse 2001; Münch 2008; Höpner/Schäfer 
2008; Graziono/Jacquot/Palier 2011; Kelemen 2011). While the overall transformation 
of European economies, societies and polities must surely be the cumulative effect of a 
multitude of proactive and reactive interactions of public and private agents, many of 
the most salient changes can be traced directly to specific policy choices at the European 
level. Hence the puzzle remains; and in order to account for the absence of manifest 
legitimacy crises, a second hypothesis and a more complex normative model need to be 
considered.
This hypothesis starts from the recognition that the EU is not a free-standing, single-
level state, but part of the two-level constellation of the European polity. In it, the mem-
ber states are indeed expected to conform to the full range of liberal as well as repub-
lican criteria of legitimacy – and it is their legitimacy which, until very recently, has 
protected the Union against direct challenges to its policies (Scharpf 2007, 2009). To 
clarify this argument, it is useful to distinguish between an enforcement–compliance 
relationship and a legitimating relationship between governments and citizens. They 
are congruent in unitary states and in states corresponding to the model of “dual fed-
eralism” (where central and regional governments are responsible for different policy 
areas and rely on their own, separate enforcement structures). Even in German “unitary 
federalism,” where compliance with federal law is enforced by Länder authorities, con-
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gruence is ensured by the fact that the dominant legitimating relationship runs between 
citizens and the national government, and that Länder elections are generally treated by 
political parties and the media as “second order national elections” in which the per-
formance of the federal government is treated as a salient issue (Burkhart 2008; Moore/
Jacoby/Gunlicks 2008). 
The two-level polity comprising the European Union and its member states shares 
some important structural characteristics with German federalism (Scharpf 1988). As 
in Germany, citizens do not confront the higher-level government directly. From their 
perspective, compliance is demanded almost exclusively by the administrative agencies, 
tax authorities and courts of their national polities. And from the Union’s perspective, 
what matters is the willingness and ability of its member governments to ensure the 
implementation of European law. This is the compliance which the Commission keeps 
monitoring, and which is also the subject of a growing body of compliance research 
(Falkner et al. 2005; Zürn/Joerges 2005; Börzel at al. 2007).
In contrast to Germany, however, we also see a two-step legitimating relationship in 
the European polity. Whereas in German federalism, public debates and party compe-
tition focus on national policies and politics, and citizens are used to addressing their 
demands and their electoral responses to the higher (national) level of government, the 
higher level of the European polity is generally beyond the horizon of citizens’ expecta-
tions and political demands; it is not the target of public debates and party competition, 
and most importantly, it is not vulnerable to electoral sanctions (Mair 2008). Citizens 
will not usually know the origin of the rules with which they are asked to comply, but 
they know that the only government which they might hold politically accountable is 
their own. In effect, therefore, national governments must generally bear the full bur-
den of political accountability for unwelcome exercises of governing authority, regard-
less of how much European law may have contributed to these. 
Figure 1 Compliance and legitimation in multilevel governments
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In a republican framework insisting on collective self-determination and democratic 
accountability, therefore, the EU must be legitimated not as a government of citizens, 
but as a government of governments.15 What matters first and foremost is the willing-
ness and ability of member states to implement EU law and to assume political respon-
sibility for doing so. But if that is the case, normative discussions of EU legitimacy also 
need to reflect the limits of their capacity to justify the European policies they must 
implement. At a superficial level, the answer to the first question is easy. Democratically 
accountable governments unanimously agreed to create the European Union with its 
competences, institutions and decision rules – or they joined it later in full knowledge 
of the acquis and its obligations. They did so to realize purposes and to deal with prob-
lems that are beyond the reach of national policy choices. At the same time, however, 
these benefits of membership – and ultimately European integration itself – are highly 
vulnerable to the temptations of free riding. Hence, there are very good normative argu-
ments obliging member states to comply with European law (Garrett 1992, 1995).
In relation to their own citizens, however, governments remain responsible for protect-
ing and advancing the common good. If they find it necessary to participate in inter-
national or supranational institutions in order to deal with problems that could not be 
resolved in the national domain, there ought to be good output-oriented arguments 
supporting integration. Where that is so, governments should be able to justify Europe-
an policies in “communicative discourses” (V. A. Schmidt 2006) if these are challenged 
in national politics. And if they do not succeed, they will have to bear the political cost.16 
In any case, however, they will remain accountable to their citizens for the policies they 
implement. From the perspective of republican legitimacy, that is as it should be. The 
electoral responsibility of national governments could only end – as is true in unitary 
German federalism – if and when the higher-level government becomes politically ac-
countable for its own policy choices. 
Since this is not yet so in the European Union, governments are likely to use their roles 
in EU legislation to avoid European policies whose immediate impact would provoke 
politically salient opposition at the national level. Nevertheless, input-legitimacy will be 
weakened by the need to find compromise solutions that will deviate from pre-existing 
domestic preferences in order to accommodate the positions of other member states 
as well (Scharpf 2000). Moreover, the multiple-veto system that limits the political sa-
15 This is not meant to say that a purely “intergovernmentalist” model would be either empirically 
or normatively sufficient (Eriksen/Fossum 2009). Much of what the EU is in fact doing cannot 
be explained as the outcome of pure intergovernmental bargaining (Falkner 2011). And for 
much of what the EU is in fact doing, it makes no sense to postulate a meaningful legitimating 
chain linking European policy choices to governments, governments to national parliaments, 
and these to national elections (Hix 2008). What I am saying is that in the absence of a direct 
legitimating relationship with its citizens, the EU must rely not only on the compliance of its 
member governments, but also on their legitimacy. 
16 Since voters and political opponents are not obliged to be fair, blaming the EU and confessing 
their own impotence is unlikely to be a useful strategy for embattled governments. 
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lience of individual EU decisions will also prevent national governments from inter-
vening against their cumulative impact if negative effects of “Europeanization” should 
become politically salient in national constituencies. 
There is no question, then, that legitimacy intermediation in the two-level European 
polity is no equivalent for the legitimating potential of democratic self-government in 
the unitary or federal nation-state. But since the preconditions of republican legitimacy 
do not (yet) exist at the European level, it is the best we can rely on for the time being. 
And until recently, at any rate, the moderating influence of national governments on 
EU legislation, and their continuing accountability for its implementation, has shielded 
the Union against the legitimacy crises which authors and politicians castigating its 
democratic deficit should have expected. In the present euro crisis, however, the shield 
of legitimacy intermediation has been pushed aside as citizens are directly confronted 
with the massive impact of European policies – and with their manifest lack of demo-
cratic legitimacy.
5 The end of legitimacy intermediation in the euro crisis 
By its own logic, legitimacy intermediation cannot support those “supranational” Eu-
ropean governing functions in whose exercise member-state governments (or the Eu-
ropean Parliament, for that matter) are not involved. Most prominent among these17 is 
the power of judicial legislation exercised by the European Court of Justice and the Eu-
ropean Central Bank’s power over monetary and exchange rate policies in the Monetary 
Union. In the literature, their legitimacy is often taken for granted, since national con-
stitutional democracies are also respecting the political independence of constitutional 
courts, central banks and some regulatory agencies (e.g., Majone 1996; Moravcsik 2002). 
But the analogy is misleading. At the national level, the independence of central banks 
and regulatory agencies is supported and could be modified by democratically account-
able governments and parliaments, and even the independence of judicial review is 
exercised in the context of common public space as a horizontal dialogue among (in the 
language of American constitutional law) “co-equal branches of government” (Bickel 
1962). In the EU, by contrast, the horizontal dialogue is transformed into a vertical, 
hierarchical relationship between supranational authorities and national agents.18 And 
efforts to correct the ECB’s policy or the rule announced in a Treaty-based ECJ decision 
would require Treaty amendments that must be ratified by parliaments or referenda 
17 The Commission’s power to define and apply competition rules for the private and public sector 
should also be included here.
18 Some observers might detect traces of a virtual dialogue between some judgments in Luxem-
bourg and in Karlsruhe. But how could the ECJ interact with similar interlocutors in all 27 
member states?
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in all 27 EU member states. In other words, the ECJ and the ECB are much further re-
moved from the influence of democratically accountable governors than is true of their 
formally “independent” counterparts in constitutional democracies. 
As a consequence, supranational EU government cannot be legitimated, even indirectly, 
by input-oriented arguments. Its justification can only be derived from output-orient-
ed arguments. In other words, it must depend on the belief that the common good 
of the community is better served by authorities that are not under the direct control 
of parliaments and governments exposed to electoral accountability and the tempta-
tions of partisan politics. Thus, the independence of judicial review, in particular, is 
supported by the deeply entrenched (liberal as well as republican) conviction that the 
democratic process itself depends on the protection of civic rights. By contrast, broad 
support for politically independent central banks is a more recent achievement, owed 
to the intellectual ascendancy of monetarist economics. When invoked at the European 
level, however, both justifications appear deficient. 
The ECJ has had little or no opportunity to protect civic rights and the institutional 
foundations of democratic processes. Instead, its authority did benefit from a general 
respect for the rule of law and a more specific admiration for its role as the “motor of 
European integration.” At the same time, however, its vigorous protection and exten-
sion of individual (and mainly economic) rights has been the major force in a liberal 
transformation of the political economies of EU member states. Whether the overall 
impact of the ECJ’s judicial legislation has been to serve the common good of the Euro-
pean polity is certainly not obvious. But since I have explored these issues elsewhere, I 
will relegate them here to a footnote.19
While the ECJ’s judicial legislation may arguably have exceeded its intended mandate, 
this was certainly not true of the ECB. The institutional structure of the Monetary 
Union, the ECB’s mandate and the constraints on member-state autonomy were unani-
19 Initially, “integration through law” (Cappelletti/Seccombe/Weiler 1985) was widely applauded 
as an effective way of removing political blockades  at the end of the 1970s. Empowered by its 
early and largely uncontested assertion of the supremacy and the direct effect of European law, 
the ECJ was in fact able to go beyond the original intent of member governments by advanc-
ing the “negative integration” of European economies through its very extensive interpreta-
tion of individual economic liberties (Alter 2001, 2009; Stone Sweet 2004; Scharpf 1999, 2011a; 
Höpner/Schäfer 2008; S. K. Schmidt 2011). As a consequence, ECJ decisions have progressively 
reduced the domain of allowable national policy choices (Kelemen 2011). And since “positive 
integration” through European legislation was and is still impeded by high consensus require-
ments (Falkner 2011), judicial legislation has been a major factor in the liberal transformation 
of political cultures in EU member states (Scharpf 2010). Promoted in individual cases of very 
low political salience, this transformation has largely proceeded below the threshold of public 
attention. It was only when a series of ECJ decisions seemed to upset national rules of industrial 
relations (Joerges/Rödl 2008; Rödl 2009) that some political actors began to take notice – but 
apparently with little effect (Blauberger 2012). So even though integration through law imposes 
increasingly tight constraints on democratic policy choices at the national level, its own legiti-
macy has not (or not yet) become a politically salient issue.
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mously adopted by governments and ratified after much public debate by parliaments 
or referenda in all EU member states. And the ECB was perfectly complying with its 
mandate to ensure price stability in the eurozone. If the outcome is nevertheless a euro 
crisis that seems to be threatening European integration itself, its cause was neither 
“agency drift” nor even the noncompliance of member governments, but deficient theo-
retical assumptions that had supported the legitimating belief that creating the Mon-
etary Union would serve the common interest.20 
Monetary Union and the failure of output legitimacy
These beliefs could be described as a “monetarist fallacy.” For national economies, mon-
etarist economic theory predicts inflation-free economic growth if the stability-orient-
ed monetary policy of an independent central bank assumes the leading role in mac-
roeconomic management and if governments avoid inflationary budget deficits. That 
assumes, of course, that the bank’s policy will be targeted on the actual conditions of 
the national economy. With regard to a European Monetary Union, however, mon-
etary economists (mainly American) pointed out that monetarist assignment of gov-
erning functions presupposes an “optimal currency area” (Mundell 1961), and that the 
monetarist model could not work in a eurozone comprising extremely heterogeneous 
national economies (Eichengreen 1990; Feldstein 1997). But in the political drive for 
more European integration, these warnings were disregarded. Instead, it was believed 
that more intense interaction in the Monetary Union itself would also ensure the con-
vergence of economic conditions (Dyson/Featherstone 1999; Issing 2002; Marsh 2009; 
Heipertz/Verdun 2010). On theoretical grounds, however, one should instead have ex-
pected a reinforcement of divergent dynamics (Enderlein 2004).
As it turned out, theory was the better predictor: uniform ECB interest rates pushed 
low-inflation economies like Germany into a prolonged recession while stimulating the 
former soft-currency economies of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (the GIPSI 
countries) into credit-financed overexpansion and real estate bubbles. In its first decade, 
therefore, the Monetary Union generated an increasing divergence of unit labor costs, 
current-account balances and compensating capital flows between surplus and deficit 
economies. Thus, when the global economy was shaken by the international financial 
crisis following the collapse of the Lehman bank in 2008, the credit squeeze was most 
disastrous in the GIPSI economies that had come to depend on the availability of mas-
sive capital imports. And as domestic demand fell and unemployment increased steeply, 
governments intervened and public-sector deficits escalated, as they did everywhere. 
However, in the GIPSI countries, some of which had reduced public-sector debt to ex-
tremely low levels before the crisis, the rise was steeper than elsewhere. At this point, fi-
20 My account is based on the research presented in Scharpf (2011b) and a number of later but 
unpublished papers and presentations.
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nally, investors began to worry about the ability-to-pay of euro states whose economies 
depended on capital imports to compensate negative current accounts. And as the risk 
premia of government bonds increased and debt refinancing became more expensive, 
the danger of state insolvency – first in Greece and then in other GIPSI states – has 
turned into a crisis of the euro itself. 
What we have, then, is a major step in European economic integration which deprived 
democratic member states of macroeconomic controls over their national economic fates 
by establishing a strictly non-democratic supranational regime whose claim to output 
legitimacy depended on the “monetarist fallacy.” Since this belief was mistaken, uniform 
supranational monetary policy was wrong for Germany, where it caused a deep recession 
between 2001 and 2005, and it was wrong for the GIPSI economies, where it generated 
the preconditions of the present crises. Initially, however, political blame was allocated at 
the national level. Since the effects of misspecified monetary impulses are indirect, and 
were politically invisible while the ECB was ostensibly following its mandate, and since 
voters are not obliged to be fair, national governments had to pay for the massive failure 
of European policy – first in Germany in 2005, and then in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain and Italy as well. But that has not been the end of the story, and in the process, the 
role of European policy has become much more visible and problematic.
Rescuing the euro through supranational intervention 
The threat of state insolvency first arose in Greece at the beginning of 2010, and for a 
few months it seemed possible that its government would be left to cope with it. But 
it soon became clear that Greek bankruptcy might undermine the solvency of credi-
tor banks in France and Germany, that it might trigger domino effects in other GIPSI 
states, and that a Greek exit from the Monetary Union might provoke currency fluctua-
tions that could reduce the competitive advantage that German exports enjoyed in the 
Monetary Union. By May of 2010, therefore, the German government had come to see 
the Greek government-debt crisis as a threat to the euro, and a collapse of the euro as a 
threat to European integration. And in the same spirit, all eurozone governments were 
ready to ignore the “no-bail-out clause” and other constraints of the Maastricht Treaty 
in order to save the euro at any cost. In the process, however, they also have destroyed 
the precarious preconditions of legitimacy intermediation in the European polity.
There is no point in detailing here the sequence of rescue operations, the still ongoing 
efforts of institutional reform and the economic effects these have brought about by the 
time of this writing (July 2012). From a democratic theory perspective, what matters 
most are two basic characteristics: 
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First, the rescue operations themselves have been exclusively targeted at the state-credit 
crises, rather than at the crises of the real economies of the GIPSI states. Their focus is on 
the insolvency threat caused by escalating costs of (re)financing public debt in interna-
tional credit markets. And apart from interventions by the ECB in secondary markets, re-
lief is provided through the reduced-rate credits from rescue funds which are supported 
by direct contributions and guarantees burdening the budgets of all eurozone states.
Second, these rescue credits are associated with “conditionalities” whose ostensible pur-
pose is to reduce or eliminate the need for state credit in the short term, and to prevent 
its recurrence in the future. Thus the “memoranda of understanding” defined by the 
Commission, controlled by the “Troika” and sanctioned by the Ecofin Council have 
imposed severe budget cuts, public-sector layoffs and increased consumption taxes – 
which further reduced aggregate demand, employment and tax revenues in depressed 
real economies.
Since these effects could have been easily foreseen, one must assume the influence of 
counterfactually stabilized cognitive and normative “frames.” One reason must have 
been the fact that the rescue credits must ultimately be backed by the commitments 
of taxpayers in the creditor states (rather than by enabling the ECB to play the role of 
“creditor of last resort” for all euro states). Thus, creditor governments accountable to 
their taxpayers surely had reason to insist on conditions, controls and sanctions. 
Even more important, however, seems to have been the persistent intellectual and polit-
ical influence of the monetarist fallacy: if stability-oriented monetary policy in national 
economies works best when excessive public-sector deficits are avoided, the failure of 
stability-oriented ECB policy must have been caused by excessive national deficits. And 
since the Greek case seemed to fit the pattern (at least to some extent), the dogma was 
reinforced, even though Germany had also found itself compelled to violate the Maas-
tricht criteria during its deep recession, and even though Ireland and Spain had reduced 
their public debt far below the Maastricht requirements. In this spirit, austerity dictates 
could not be relaxed even though real economies continued to shrink while mass un-
employment escalated to levels unheard of since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
Moreover, at German insistence, most EU governments have now agreed to a “Fiscal 
Pact” 21 that is meant to permanently enforce fiscal discipline by requiring the adoption 
of balanced-budget rules in all national constitutions. At the same time, some of the 
EU’s “Six-Pack Regulations”22 have tightened the Excessive Deficit Procedures of the 
Stability Pact by introducing stringent European supervision and quasi-automatic sanc-
21 Treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union (signed 
on March 2, 2012).
22 Council Directive 2011/85/EU; Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011; Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011; 
Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011; Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011; Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011.
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tioning mechanisms in case of noncompliance, and they have also extended supervision, 
direction and sanctioning in a new Excessive Imbalances Procedure that will allow the 
Commission to control a wide range of national economic and social policy choices.
More generally, the lessons which European policy-makers have drawn from the euro 
crisis did not include a re-examination of the economics of monetary centralization 
or a reflection on the monetarist fallacy (De Grauwe 2009; Feldstein 2011). They con-
tinue to ignore the disastrous role of one-size-fits-all monetary policy, and they insist 
on blaming the crisis on national policy failures. In effect, they seem to have convinced 
themselves that democratically accountable national governments and parliaments 
simply cannot be trusted to adopt and implement the kind of policies that would make 
the euro work. 
From this, it might also follow that creating the supranational Monetary Union was a 
case of premature and excessive institutional integration. But given the unconditional 
political commitment to save the euro, that conclusion would not be policy relevant. 
Instead, the dominant view has come to the belief that the Monetary Union was insuf-
ficiently supranational and lacked the powers to create the preconditions for the success 
of the monetarist model at the level of the eurozone. 
In hindsight, therefore, it is seen as a fatal mistake that the deficit rules of the Stability 
Pact were not rigorously enforced against Germany and France. And if heterogeneous 
national economies failed to converge as expected, governments should have been forced 
to adopt policies that would have ensured convergence. The primary goal should have 
been major increases in economic flexibility – even if these would have required major 
economic, institutional and social transformations. In most member states, this would 
have included politically controversial measures to increase the profitability of private 
investment, to eliminate rigidities of the labor and service markets, to privatize public 
enterprises, and to generally reduce the burdens of the welfare state on the economy.
This, at any rate, was the logic of the “supply-side” reforms adopted by Margaret Thatcher 
and Ronald Reagan after their conversion to monetarism in the 1980s. It was also the 
logic of the somewhat milder Hartz IV program which Germany, under the constraints 
of euro-monetarism, adopted in response to the long recession of 2001–2005. And much 
harsher versions of such supply-side reforms have, in fact, been defined and enforced 
through the “conditionalities” imposed on the GIPSI governments that had to apply for 
rescue credits in the euro crisis.
From an economic perspective, the elective affinity between monetarism and supply-
side policies seems quite plausible. And if the monetarist model should ever be made to 
work in the eurozone, it would indeed depend on a much greater degree of convergence 
among the heterogeneous member economies. It also seems plausible that greater con-
vergence would require much greater degrees of economic flexibility, which could not 
be achieved without major supply-side adjustments in most or all euro states. In other 
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words, if the euro is to be defended at all costs, economic logic does seem to suggest that 
the combination of fiscal discipline and liberalizing “structural” reforms may be the 
price that must be paid. 
Whether the present strategy is likely to succeed in rescuing the euro, and whether its 
potential success would outweigh its costs in terms of mass unemployment, social in-
equality and societal disintegration, are not issues that I will explore here. Instead, I 
wish to discuss its implications for political legitimacy in the European polity. What 
matters here is the fact that, practically for the first time in the history of European in-
tegration, European policies have a direct and massive impact on the lives and concerns 
of citizens or on their highly salient political preferences, while European policy-makers 
are perfectly visible as the authors of these policies. 
In this regard, the situation in countries where fiscal discipline and supply-side reforms 
were externally imposed and controlled differs from constellations where similarly un-
welcome policies were chosen and defended in national elections by the politically ac-
countable Thatcher, Reagan or Schröder governments. Quite obviously, national demo-
cratic processes were disabled as ever more detailed and highly publicized instructions 
on welfare cutbacks and labor market deregulation had to be implemented by succes-
sive Greek governments and parliaments without even the opportunity for face-saving 
gestures – let alone the permission to call a referendum. Or take the Portuguese experi-
ence, where in May 2011, all potential governing parties were required to promise that 
they would carry out the “memorandum of understanding” regardless of the outcome 
of the upcoming national election. Moreover, from the citizens’ perspective, the au-
thors of these dictates are not anonymous market forces; they have the faces of Merkel, 
Schäuble, Sarkozy, Barroso and Trichet – none of whom, however, can be taken to ac-
count by Greek or Portuguese voters. 
But if the loss of autonomy is obvious for debtor states, it is no less true for the par-
liaments of creditor countries, which are asked to accept ever more staggering com-
mitments to cover the ever increasing financial risks associated with a succession of 
rescue funds. And in spite of negative majorities in opinion surveys, spectacular gains 
by anti-European parties, the collapse of coalition governments or the injunctions of 
constitutional courts, it is clear that agreement will ultimately be “alternativlos”: sum-
mit resolutions and Ecofin agreements on the rescue of the euro have the character of 
take-it-or-leave-it offers that no member-state parliament could afford to reject.23
23 This may be different in countries like Germany and Finland whose governments have either 
taken a leading role in shaping European agreements or have succeeded in gaining special ar-
rangements protecting salient national interests. Under either condition, national accountabil-
ity may still have some substantive meaning. But neither of them could possibly be generalized. 
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In other words, the European responses to the euro crisis have disabled national demo-
cratic legitimacy, and at the same time, they have destroyed the possibility of legitimacy 
intermediation on which the European polity so far had depended. For the first time, 
therefore, the exercise of European governing functions must depend on its own legiti-
macy.
6 Legitimate supranational government?
But on which arguments could it be based? 
Output-oriented justifications of present rescue measures have lost most of their plau-
sibility after having failed over the course of more than two years. And even the opti-
mistic expectations associated with supply-side reforms could only envisage a long and 
difficult road to the eventual recovery of the GIPSI economies. At the same time, there 
is also no chance that claims to output legitimacy could support radical alternatives 
suggesting the exit of Greece and perhaps other GIPSI states, or even a return from the 
Monetary Union to the more flexible European Monetary System of 1979–1999. Exits 
might nevertheless happen, and they would restore political autonomy at the national 
level. But their economic, social and political effects are still shrouded in radical uncer-
tainty. And if they were now proposed as European policy choices, they could not gener-
ate the trust in responsible government on which output legitimacy must depend. The 
same could be said of the vision that would try to use the euro crisis as an opportunity 
to achieve a breakthrough to a European federal state. On the one hand, it is unclear 
how such efforts might contribute to a resolution of present economic crises, and on 
the other hand it seems entirely unrealistic that political integration, in contrast to the 
economic integration of the last century, could now be promoted as progress to an un-
controversial “common good.” 
So if “rescuing-the-euro” policies are not supported by output-oriented legitimating 
arguments, could they be justified by input-oriented criteria?
Input-oriented European legitimacy?
“Rescuing-the-euro” policies had – and still have – major impacts on citizens’ personal 
interests and highly salient preferences in debtor and creditor countries alike, and if 
they should have to be justified in input-oriented terms, it is necessary to specify the 
type of policies and the institutions and processes in which these are determined. 
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The Monetary Union has totally removed the competences of monetary and exchange 
rate policies from its member states, and it has tried to constrain their fiscal compe-
tences. In the euro crisis, debtor states have completely lost fiscal autonomy, and the ex-
ercise of wide ranges of their economic, social and labor-market competences has been 
subjected to direct European control. Creditor states, on their part, have been required 
to carry the main burden of rescue credits through direct contributions and financial 
guarantees from their own budgets and at the expense of their own taxpayers. Moreover, 
with the recent adoption of the Six-Pack Regulations and of the Fiscal Pact, European 
control over fiscal policy and over an indefinite range of other national competences is 
being generalized to apply to all member states, regardless of any applications for rescue 
credits. What needs to be legitimated, therefore, are European controls over national 
policy choices and national resources, rather than choices about common European 
policies and the allocation of European resources. 
In order to appreciate the implications, it seems useful to consider the “Excessive Imbal-
ance Procedure” that was adopted as a directly applicable EU regulation by the Coun-
cil and Parliament in November 2011 (EU 1176, 2011). In contrast to the dominant 
obsession with past budget deficits, the regulation does perceive the euro crisis as a 
consequence of the extreme divergence of macroeconomic balances that had developed 
among the economies of the eurozone. But avoiding any reference to the negative im-
pact of uniform monetary policy on heterogeneous economies, the regulation focuses 
entirely on the need to control national policies. To this effect, the Commission has de-
fined a “scoreboard” of internal and external statistical “indicators,” ranging from cur-
rent-account balances, real effective exchange rates and export market shares to house 
prices, private sector debt and unemployment rates.24 If Commission-defined upper 
or lower thresholds are exceeded, the Commission will investigate and, upon finding 
excessive imbalances, will issue “recommendations” which may become binding and 
entail quasi-automatic sanctions in case of noncompliance. 
In contrast to rules on budget deficits, however, practically all the balances listed in the 
scoreboard are not under the direct control of governments. Before entering the Mon-
etary Union, national policy-makers would have influenced them indirectly through 
the monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate instruments available for macroeconomic man-
agement. Since these instruments are no longer available at the national level (and since 
their use by the ECB will continue to increase imbalances25), it is certainly not obvious 
what governments should have done to avoid the rise of macroeconomic imbalances 
in the past.26 And the regulation does not even try to specify the measures through 
24 Alert Mechanism Report, COM (2012) 68 final.
25 At the time of this writing (July 2012), ECB interest rates (and even more so, real interest rates) 
are too high for the depressed GIPSI economies and too low for Germany. 
26 In the German recession of 2001–2005, union wage restraint and supply-side reforms helped, 
albeit at the cost of a drastic increase of social inequality (OECD 2011). But it is much more 
difficult to see what GIPSI governments could have done to prevent the expansion of credit-
financed private demand. 
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which they should prevent the rise of house prices or of private sector debt in the future. 
It merely requests that they should comply with the Commission’s recommendations 
which “should be addressed to the Member State concerned to provide guidance on appro-
priate policy responses. The policy response of the Member State should use all available 
policy instruments under the control of public authorities” (EU 1176/2011 at § 20). 
Remarkably, the most troubling constitutional implications of this regime seem to have 
been totally ignored: regardless of the Treaty’s allocation of governing functions be-
tween the Union and its member states, the Commission will be free to specify any and 
all national measures which it may consider economically useful – and it may do so 
without reference to any predefined rules nor even a shared theoretical paradigm of the 
kind that Keynesian as well as monetarist macroeconomics had provided. And once the 
recommendations are effective, it is the Commission who will decide to impose severe 
penalties for noncompliance – unless a qualified majority of governments in the Coun-
cil can be mobilized to reject these. 
What has been established here is not an improved system of Keynesian or monetarist 
macroeconomic management (that would operate in the context of established eco-
nomic theory, research and public criticism) but a discretionary regime of suprana-
tional intervention in the management of national economies and societies. While the 
EU regulation was – albeit on a disputable Treaty base (Höpner/Rödl 2012) – adopted 
by the community method of EU legislation, it does not and could not by itself specify 
any general rules that member states should follow. Instead, it leaves it to the Commis-
sion to define not only performance criteria for national economies but also the specific 
measures that governments should adopt to correct imbalances. And given the extreme-
ly diverse and contingent conditions to which economic interventions must respond, it 
would indeed be counterproductive from a problem-solving perspective if governments, 
or the Commission for that matter, were required to apply predefined rules. But under 
the criteria of liberal as well as republican constitutionalism, discretionary authority 
must either be narrowly circumscribed or subject to democratic accountability.
Since the Commission itself lacks any kind of input-oriented legitimacy, the regula-
tion did assign formal authority to the eurozone Ecofin Council, even though its actual 
influence is minimized by the “reverse-qualified-majority” rule for the adoption of rec-
ommendations and the imposition of sanctions.27 But even if a positive Council vote 
were required, that would not suffice to create intergovernmental input legitimacy.28 
The decisions in question do not (and could not) adopt common rules for all mem-
ber states. Instead, they impose directions and sanctions on individual member states 
27 Regulations EU 1176/2011 at Art. 10 (4) and EU 1174/2011 at Art. 3 (3). The European Parlia-
ment would even have preferred automatic sanctions. 
28 The problem, at this point, is not simply the domination of “executives” in all processes of res-
cuing the euro – which is condemned by Habermas (2011) and other promoters of European 
democracy. It would persist if all Council decisions were ratified by national parliaments. 
Scharpf: Legitimacy Intermediation in the Multilevel European Polity 29
in matters which are generally within their constitutional domains. Concededly, the 
governments represented in the Council may be constitutionally and democratically 
legitimated to agree to common rules binding, and obligations burdening, their own 
polities. But there is no way in which German or Finnish voters and parliaments, or the 
voters and parliaments of most member states,29 could authorize their governments 
to impose special sacrifices on the citizens of Greece or Portugal or of any other mem-
ber state. In other words, intergovernmental input legitimacy may sustain general rules 
applying to all member states, but it cannot legitimate discretionary interventions in 
individual member states. 
This is different in unitary states organized by the principle of “democratic centralism,” 
where legitimate authority is concentrated at the top and may legitimately intervene 
in any and all matters at regional or local levels. In federal nation-states with demo-
cratically legitimate federal and regional governments, by contrast, the instances of al-
lowable federal intervention in matters reserved to the regions are rare and carefully 
circumscribed by the Constitution. The European Union, however – let alone the eu-
rozone – is still far from being a federal state with a democratically legitimated central 
authority. If that is so, the discretionary authority claimed by the Commission in the 
Six-Pack Regulations is neither legitimated by intergovernmental agreement nor could 
it be supported by arguments invoking the legitimacy of democratic centralism. 
In short, the Monetary Union, the euro crisis and the policies defending the euro have 
created an institutional constellation in which the control of democratic member states 
over their economic fate has been largely destroyed. Since the effective instruments have 
been removed, the loss cannot be compensated by ever more intense European controls 
of the remaining national options. Instead, effective macroeconomic control at the Eu-
ropean level would require the capacities of a federal state with a large central budget, 
centralized capital taxation and social and employment policies – and with the capacity 
for democratically legitimated majoritarian policy-making. 
Some pro-European theorists, publicists and politicians seem to hope that the euro 
crisis itself might provide the push for overcoming the resistance of self-interested gov-
ernments to political integration (Habermas 2011). But even if, under the pressure of 
an escalating crisis, governments should agree not only to further transfers of sover-
eignty, but also to the direct election of the Commission President, or if the European 
party families should present candidates for that office in EP elections, that would not 
yet create the political community which, from a republican perspective, would allow 
for legitimate majority rule. On the contrary: the euro crisis, its dominant framing as 
a consequence of fiscal irresponsibility, and the disastrous impact of rescue policies 
designed by creditor governments on the basis of this frame have provoked conflicts of 
interest and identity, mutual distrust and recrimination, and widely diverging public 
29 Like the defendant in a criminal trial, the government of the “member states concerned” will of 
course have no vote in the decision: EU 1174/2011, Art. 5; EU 1176/2011, Art. 12.
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discourses in national polities. These effects are counteracting the evolution of a “sense 
of political community” that could sustain advances of European political integration 
and democratic legitimation. There is a risk, therefore, that attempts at institutional 
reforms that would respond to the failure of the supranational Monetary Union by 
attempting to create the political infrastructure for a much wider extension of suprana-
tional governing powers may provoke political reactions that could, in the end, destroy 
the past achievements of European integration as well. 
7 Reducing the burden on European legitimacy
Now if present policies to rescue the euro and the more permanent regime that is being 
established to prevent future crises of the Monetary Union lack democratic legitimacy 
– what is to be done? The obvious solution would be to stop defending the euro, to 
acknowledge the common responsibility for having created a dysfunctional suprana-
tional regime, and to seek agreement on a common, organized and orderly return to the 
more flexible regime of an (improved) European Monetary System, which had worked 
reasonably well between 1979 and 1999. Unfortunately, however, all European policy-
makers have categorically ruled out this option, so we have neither plausible scenarios 
of how it might be implemented nor plausible estimates of the inevitably high costs of 
a possible transition. 
But if we are stuck with the Monetary Union and with European institutions whose 
weak claim to political legitimacy does not match the need for legitimating highly vis-
ible European interventions in matters that have great political salience in debtor and 
creditor countries alike, a continuation of present policies could indeed provoke a man-
ifest legitimacy crisis in the multilevel European polity. At this point, however, the logic 
of the theoretical concept of relational legitimacy introduced above may contribute a 
somewhat cynical suggestion to the search for pragmatic coping strategies: if the ca-
pacity for legitimation cannot be increased, the imbalance might still be avoided if the 
demand for legitimacy could be reduced by lowering the political salience of European 
policies. These, after all, were the conditions under which the European Union was able 
to avoid manifest challenges to its legitimacy before the present euro crisis.
Theoretical logic, of course, can only suggest directions for the search. It cannot define 
economically effective and politically feasible pragmatic solutions. But just assume that 
direct ECB credits, or a banking license of the ESM, would eliminate the need to combat 
the state-credit crisis of the GIPSI countries through budgetary commitments at the 
expense of taxpayers in creditor states. This would, of course, require a departure from 
the Maastricht prohibition of monetary state financing. At the same time, however, it 
would drastically reduce the political salience of rescue credits in the public opinion of 
creditor states – and it would, by the same token, defuse the populist pressures insisting 
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on dictates of drastic fiscal retrenchment in return for the rescue credits. As a conse-
quence, conditionalities could be relaxed somewhat, and some commitments to present 
rescue funds might be converted into transfers to stabilize the atrophied social systems 
of the GIPSI states.
If something like that were indeed to happen, the euro crisis would not be over, and 
the basic contradiction between monetary centralization in a heterogeneous eurozone 
would still persist. But the intensity of the acute crisis would be reduced, and European 
policy would contribute to its resolution, rather than merely increasing its non-legiti-
mated demands and constraints on member-state polities. In other words, interactions 
in the multilevel European polity might again return to lower levels of political salience 
– which would grant European and national policy-makers, policy intellectuals and pol-
icy researchers the time to explore more sustainable long-term solutions.
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